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COMMENTARY
What is the Ideal
Monetary Policy Regime?




The recent financial crisis has emphasized the role of sound monetary
policy for ensuring Canada’s future prosperity. Although much is right
with the Bank of Canada’s inflation-targeting regime, improvements
such as price-level targeting and closer attention to potential financial
instability should be considered in the lead-up to the renewal of the
program in 2011.
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MONETARY POLICYThe Bank of Canada’s current inflation-targeting program has been successful in
meeting the goals of monetary policy by giving Canadians confidence in the value 
of their money. Yet this success should not preclude consideration of improvements 
to the program, especially taking into account the genesis of the recent credit 
crisis. This Commentary describes improvements that should be considered as the
inflation-targeting policy comes up for review in 2011.
In order to move toward an ideal monetary policy regime, the Bank should address the
following areas:
￿ Price-level targeting: Target the path of the CPI rather than the inflation rate and
ensure that it rises by 2 percent a year on average and commit to lowering this rate
of increase over the coming decade until true price-level stability is achieved. This
would differ from the current policy in that it requires the Bank to “undo” past
deviations from the target rather than letting bygones be bygones.
￿ Interest-rate rules: Begin to experiment with interest-rate rules, and ask the Bank’s
economists to examine the robustness of alternative rules. Use the best rules as a
benchmark against which to check interest-rate decisions. Decisions based on
simple, mechanical rules bring greater clarity and predictability to decisions and
put the onus on policymakers to explain departures from the rule. 
￿ Communications: Report monetary policy performance in the form of a Taylor
curve graph, which shows the tradeoff between output and inflation volatility.
Compare Canada’s performance with those of other nations, both inflation
targeters and nontargeters.
￿ Financial stability: Monitor financial stress indexes, asset prices, and the price of
risk, and when judgment suggests financial instability is present or likely, consider
modifying the interest rate to avoid financial crisis, then explain in detail both the
concern and the reason for action.
Much is right with Canada’s current monetary policy regime. Neither its departures
from the ideal nor the gains that might be expected from moving towards the ideal are
large. The improvements described here will help move Canadian monetary policy
closer to the goals of stabilizing the value of money and minimizing the volatility of
output. The Bank should continue to emphasize the limits of monetary policy and the
success its appropriate use can achieve.
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I
n their most recent Joint Statement
on inflation targeting, the Bank of
Canada and the government of
Canada recognized that the objective of
monetary policy is “to enhance the well-
being of Canadians by contributing to
sustained economic growth, rising levels
of employment and improved living
standards.” 
They also state: “Experience has clearly shown that the
best way monetary policy can achieve this goal is by
giving Canadian households and businesses confidence
in the value of their money.” (Bank of Canada 2006).
The ideal monetary policy regime for achieving this
objective is one in which an independent but
accountable central bank is mandated to stabilize the
value of money and minimize the volatility of output. 
It pursues this mandate by making clearly explained,
rules-based decisions and by conducting and fostering
research that systematically evaluates past decisions 
and current procedures.
The Bank of Canada’s independence and account-
ability, as well as its leading role in monetary policy
research, fit this description of the ideal. And in the
other features of the ideal, much is right with
Canada’s current monetary policy regime. Neither its
departures from the ideal nor the gains that might be
expected from moving towards the ideal are large. It
would be easier to break the current regime and lose
its benefits than to improve on it. 
But improvements are available and this Commentary
describes and develops arguments to support them.1I
approach this task by considering six sets of questions
about the challenge and current success, the goals, and
the procedures of monetary policy. 
First, what is the challenge of monetary policy and
how well is the current policy regime meeting it?
Second, what do we mean by the value of money that
monetary policy should seek to stabilize? Is it
measured by a consumer price index or do we need a
broader index that includes asset prices? Third, what
do we mean by the term price stability? Is it a pre-
dictable and low average inflation rate – an inflation
target? Or is it a predictable, slowly rising trend in a
price index – a target path for the price level? Or is it
a constant price index – the natural meaning of
“stable”? Fourth, what is the appropriate instrument
for monetary policy to use and how should it be set?
Is it the overnight interest rate, the exchange rate, or a
monetary aggregate such as the monetary base or a
broader definition of money? How should the
monetary policy instrument be set? Should its value
be determined by a rule or by the votes of experts?
Fifth, how should the central bank communicate and
explain its decisions? How much information about
its own forecasts of the price level, the real economy,
and the interest rate should it share? Sixth, what role
should monetary policy play in coping with financial
instability and crisis?
Meeting the Challenge? 
The major challenge to Canada’s monetary policy
regime arises from wrong diagnoses of economic ills
and an overly optimistic view of the ills that mone-
tary policy can fix. The challenge has two sources: 
the use of a model that is ill-equipped to cope with
complexity of today’s monetary and financial systems, 
and a tendency to confuse problems in the real
economy and monetary problems.
An Ill-Equipped Model
Although the Bank of Canada uses sophisticated
econometric techniques to forecast and evaluate
alternative policy choices, the core of the model that
dominates ideas about monetary policy is, incredibly,
a model without money. Today’s well-named
“canonical” model can be summarized in three
equations:2 (1) inflation is generated by past
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This Commentary has benefited from the helpful suggestions of Steve Ambler, Robin Banerjee, Charles Freedman, Thor Koeppl, David Laidler, John
Murray, and Nicolas Rowe. They are not implicated in the conclusions or stands taken on controversial issues.
1  While Canadian monetary policy provides the focus and context for this Commentary, its conclusions are relevant to all economies.
2  Woodford (2003) provides the most extensive account of the canonical model. Not all models are devoid of money and financial assets: all the major
central banks have models with a richer structure than the canonical model. The Bank of Canada’s ToTEM model is an example – see Murchison and
Rennison (2006). But even this model lacks a convincing account of the financial sector. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996, 2000) describe a model
with an explicit role for financial markets, but not for the types of markets that brought the 2007 credit crisis.| 2 Commentary 279
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3  The Phillips curve is a suggested long-run inverse relationship between inflation and unemployment.
4  The curve is also “convex,” which means that successive decreases in inflation volatility require ever greater increases in output volatility (and successive
decreases in output volatility require ever greater increases in inflation volatility).
inflation, expectations of current and future
inflation, and the gap between actual and potential
gross domestic product (GDP), the so-called output
gap; (2) the output gap is generated by the past
output gap, actual and expected inflation, exogenous
domestic and foreign shocks, and the monetary
policy interest rate; and (3) the monetary policy
interest rate is determined by the central bank’s
mandate and decision rule.
This model has worked well in a world of asset
market stability. It has even worked reasonably well
in a world with a dot-com stock market bubble and
bust and an Asian financial market crisis. But it is
asking a great deal of this model to provide reliable
policy guidance in a world with a meltdown in credit
markets and other financial markets.
The absence of money and financial markets from
the standard model has two consequences, both
serious and one potentially fatal. The nonfatal con-
sequence is that the model might not predict as
reliably under credit market stress as it does in
normal credit market conditions. The potentially
fatal consequence is that it might lead to confusion
between monetary problems – problems that
monetary policy can address – and real problems –
problems that monetary policy cannot handle.
Real and Monetary Confusion
The old confusion between monetary and real
problems was summarized in the so-called Phillips
curve3 and the (incorrect) belief that monetary
policy could lower the unemployment rate per-
manently. We are now beyond that confusion. But a
new confusion might turn out to be that of seeing
the price of risk as a variable that monetary policy
can (and should) influence. Lowering the policy
interest rate in an attempt to offset the consequences
of a high price of risk might turn out to be as
mistaken as the use of a low interest rate to lower the
unemployment rate permanently.
It seems hard to deny that risk is real and that the
price of risk is the relative price that regulates the
demand for and supply of risk. Markets – some of
the most sophisticated yet created – enable risk to be
traded, sliced and diced, shared, recycled, and
repackaged. In the long run, the real quantities and
prices of the risks traded in these markets are inde-
pendent of the value of money.
In the short run, these real variables interact with
monetary variables in ways that are potentially
powerful yet currently not well understood. It is vital
that, in thinking about the ideal monetary policy
regime, we keep a clear head about the distinction
between real and monetary factors in the markets for
risk. We must not get sidetracked into thinking that
we can achieve price stability goals while using
monetary policy to offset a high price of risk in the
pursuit of financial market stability. The real-
monetary confusion that makes labour and goods
markets function inefficiently might be even more
troublesome for financial markets. And boosting dis-
tressed financial markets with a low interest rate
might turn out to be as inflationary as was the
mistaken pursuit of an unsustainably high level of
real economic activity. I return to this issue in the
final section of the Commentary.
Current Performance
As the Bank of Canada so clearly appreciates, price
stability enhances the standard of living: it does not
force a choice between a high and sustainably
growing standard of living and price stability. But
monetary policy does face a tradeoff, between the
variability of inflation and the variability of real
economic activity, summarized in the so-called
Taylor curve (Taylor 1979).
The Taylor curve is a bit like the more familiar
Phillips curve except that its variables are standard
deviations rather than means (and the conventional
way of drawing the curve places the standard
deviation of the output gap on the y-axis and the
standard deviation of the inflation rate on the x-axis).
The Taylor curve shows the tradeoff between
inflation variability and real GDP variability when
the best available policy rule is employed; it is an
inverse relationship, so points on the curve with
higher inflation volatility are associated with lower
output volatility.4 If the best policy rule is not in use,Commentary 279 | 3
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moving to a better rule provides a “free lunch” and
does not involve a tradeoff; that is, by adopting a
better policy rule, the volatility of both inflation and
output can be lowered.
The Taylor curve is a handy way to describe the
best that monetary policy might achieve, to describe
what it has achieved, and to make cross-country
comparisons. Figure 1 shows an example of a Taylor
curve, as well as the performance of Canada and four
other inflation targeters before and during the era of
inflation targeting.5 It is striking that inflation
targeting improved performance for all five central
banks. Some of the improvement in performance
was most likely the result of a quieter global macro-
economic environment after 1992, and even the
nontargeting United States and Japan shared in the
improved performance. But the inflation targeters
improved by more than the nontargeters.6 Based on
the criterion of low variability, New Zealand
performed the worst of the five, while one can
interpret the others as having chosen different points
on the variability tradeoff.
What Is the Value of Money?
The value of money is the inverse of the price level.
But what is the price level? Is it an index of the prices
of current consumption goods and services, and if
so, which specific index? Or is it an index of a
broader set of prices than those of current con-
sumption? If broader, how much broader: everything
in GDP, or all current goods and services and assets?
The answers on which Canada’s inflation-targeting
regime is based are that only the prices of current
5  Computed Taylor curves depend on model specification, data, and policy rules. For a comprehensive set of calculated Taylor curves, see Levin,
Wieland, and Williams (1998).
6  The data reported in Dotsey (2006) show that, for the five inflation targeters and two nontargeters, the variability of real GDP decreased by the 
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Figure 1:  The Taylor Curve: Canada and Four Other Inflation Targeters 
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consumption are relevant, that the consumer price
index (CPI) is the appropriate target, and that core
CPI is the appropriate “operational guide.”7 Are
these answers the right ones?
Let me begin with the question of the breadth of
the appropriate price index. The purpose of a price
index determines its appropriate breadth. The purpose
of the price index targeted by monetary policy may be
presumed to be to measure the value of money. We
cannot measure the value of money in some abstract
or absolute way, however, but in terms of something
that money buys. So what is that appropriate
“something”? It might be current consumption,
current production, the cost of living, or the cost of all
the things that money buys – all transactions.
The Price Level of Current Consumption
Three price indexes are viable candidates as measures
of the price level of current consumption: the CPI,
core CPI, and the chain price index for consumption
(CPIC). Figure 2 shows the inflation rates of these
three measures in Canada since 1992.8 All three
measures show a similar mean, so the choice among
them is more a theoretical than a practical matter.
The case for the CPI is that it represents an
average of all the prices that consumers face, is
published monthly with a short lag, and is well
understood by the media and the individual
consumer. The CPI has two weaknesses: volatility
and bias. The variability of the CPI – measured by
the standard deviation – is around twice that of the
other two measures. The bias of the CPI arises from
its difficulty in dealing with new goods and quality
improvements and its failure to recognize sub-
stitution effects in response to relative price changes.
The case for core CPI is that it indicates the
underlying inflation trend and might be a better
predictor of future inflation than is the total CPI. It
might also have a smaller bias than does total CPI.
The weakness of core CPI is that, by omitting
7  Core CPI is a measure that strips out the most volatile elements of the CPI.
8 I begin in 1992 because this was the first year in which the Bank of Canada brought inflation into the current target range. Although 1991 was the
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Figure 2: Three Measures of Consumer Price Inflation in Canada, 1992–2008
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9 Goodhart (2001), in a less formal and more empirically driven analysis, also suggests an approach that places some weight on asset prices.
10  The Large Value Transfer System, or LVTS, which processes the majority of payments made in Canada, handles an average of around 17,000 trans-
actions a day valued at $140 billion, which is 18 times GDP.
11  The “velocity” of money is the number of times a unit of money changes hands in transactions.
volatile prices, it omits the very prices that create
public concern when inflation is rising and runs the
risk of weakening public support for the monetary
policy goal. This weakness becomes a matter of
concern when relative prices are changing and the
items omitted from core are persistently rising faster
than the average.
The case for the chain price index for con-
sumption is that it is the only price index based on
the so-called Fisher Ideal index – that is, it handles
substitution effects and so removes the bias of the
CPI from that source, although it does not handle
quality improvement and new goods bias. The
weakness of the chain price index is its quarterly
frequency and the long time lag that must elapse
before final revisions become available.
The Price Level of Current Production
Using the GDP deflator, which measures the price of
current production, would be an easy way of broaden-
ing the meaning of the value of money. Weight would
be given to the prices of currently produced physical
capital, including houses, and so would place some
weight on asset prices. In respects other than coverage,
the GDP deflator shares the strengths and weaknesses
of the chain price index for consumption. It is a Fisher
Ideal index (a strength), but it is calculated only
quarterly, with a one-month lag for the first estimate
and a long lag for final revisions (a major weakness).
Moreover, the GDP deflator cannot provide data on
what is happening to the value of money at the
moment of a policy decision.
The Cost of Living
A cost-of-living approach to the value of money
seeks an index of the money cost of a bundle of
current and future consumption that maintains a
given level of economic welfare – or utility, or
standard of living. Reis (2005), building on ideas
first proposed by Alchian and Klein (1973), defines a
dynamic price index (DPI) that measures this
intertemporal cost of living. The analysis of Alchian
and Klein is general, and does not tell us how to
calculate the appropriate price index. In contrast,
Reis is specific, and provides an exact formula for
measuring his DPI. The DPI is a forward-looking
index that responds more to permanent price shocks
than to transitory price changes and that includes
asset prices. The DPI Reis constructs for the United
States from 1970 to 2004 tells a dramatically
different inflation story than does the CPI, since the
DPI is highly volatile and heavily influenced by
changes in the prices of houses and bonds.9
As a target for monetary policy, the DPI has some
drawbacks. First, it is not as transparent as the more
familiar CPI. Second, its volatility makes it unlikely
that it could be targeted with any precision. Further,
the attempt to target a highly volatile index would
impart volatility to the performance of the real
economy – the Taylor curve tradeoff between
volatility in inflation and real volatility would be
highly unfavourable.
The Price Level of All Transactions
The view that transactions rather than consumption
or the cost of living are the objects whose prices
combine to measure the value of money is attractive.
Money is used to buy consumption goods, all other
production including intermediate goods and
services, labour services, and assets, both real and
financial. The use of money to transact in factor
markets equals its use to transact in markets for final
goods and services. Its use in markets for inter-
mediate goods and services is several times GDP.
And money’s use in financial transactions approaches
20 times GDP.10
Irving Fisher’s famous equation of exchange states
that MV = PT; the quantity of money, M, multiplied
by its velocity of circulation, V, equals the price level,
P, multiplied by the volume of transactions, T.11
When Fisher (1911a, 1911b) wanted to put values
on P and T, he used a transactions approach. He
used wholesale prices, wage rates, and stock prices to
calculate an index for P and quantities of exports,12  The context in which this question has been discussed in the recent literature is not that of the appropriate definition of the value of money but of
whether monetary policy should also seek to avert financial crises by pre-emptive action in the build-up of the crisis. I address this issue later in the
Commentary.
13  Mankiw and Reis (2003) argue that targeting an index with a heavy weight on the money wage rate is attractive in this role and achieves minimum
output volatility.
14  Two branches of the literature on this topic are outside the scope of this review. One is on the optimum rate of inflation or deflation, which argues for
a steadily falling price level. The other is on the possible costs of low or zero inflation that includes discussions of downward nominal rigidities and the
zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate. I discuss the latter extensively in Parkin (2000); here, I do not examine these larger questions – my
premise is that price stability is the appropriate goal.
imports, sales of stocks, railroad tons carried, and
post office letters carried to calculate an index for T.
Some of these decisions were clearly driven by the
paucity of data available to him. He used wholesale
prices rather than retail prices for valuing goods
because they were the only prices available on a
broad enough scale. He used wages as proxies for the
prices of services. But significantly, he also used the
prices and volume of transactions of stocks. Fisher
did not use house transactions and house prices, but
we can be sure that he would have done so if data
had been available to him.
If the prices of labour, stocks, and other assets
moved in harmony with the prices of consumption
goods and services, the transactions approach and
the consumption approach to measuring the price
level would give the same answer. But the price of
labour (the money wage rate) is less volatile than the
prices of goods and services, and the prices of
financial transactions are more volatile.
Also, in some periods, the discrepancies between
asset prices and consumption prices are large. Before
the mid-1990s, house prices rose more slowly than
the CPI. Then, between 1994 and 2007, the CPI
increased by 32 percent while stock prices increased
by 209 percent, the price of new homes by 51
percent, and the resale price of existing homes by 98
percent.
Because money wage rates and asset prices behave
so differently from consumer prices, the question of
whether consumer prices alone provide an
appropriate measure of the value of money cannot
be dodged.12 Resolving this issue involves more than
the selection of the appropriate policy goal. It is also
bound up with the transmission mechanism – the
channels through which monetary policy actions
influence the ultimate goals of monetary policy –
and intermediate targets and indicators. Too much
money chasing too few goods brings rising prices of
goods, but it takes a long time for the extra money to
find its way into rising prices. Too much money
chasing too few stocks brings rising stock prices, and
the response is instantaneous. Too much money
chasing too few existing homes brings rising house
prices, and although the response is not instan-
taneous, it is rapid. The instantaneous stock price
response and the rapid housing price response to too
much or too little monetary stimulus might provide
signals that are dangerous to ignore.
Serious research is called for to examine the
potential gains from broadening our view of the
appropriate definition of the value of money.
Pending that research, the case for using a con-
sumption price index is strong. But we should keep
open minds on the place of money wage rates and
asset prices in defining the value of money price
index. It might well turn out that we want to stick
with a consumer goods price index as the formal
target but use a broader index to provide early
warnings of possible departures from the narrower
target.13This question, too, needs to be high on the
research agenda.
The balance of strengths and weaknesses of the
alternatives considered favours the CPI. It is well
understood, measures the prices that people face, and
can be adjusted for bias, which is persistent rather
than variable. It is the easiest index to explain to the
public whose interest monetary policy seeks to serve.
What Constitutes Price Stability?
I now turn to the third question: what constitutes
price stability, or, what is the appropriate operational
price stability goal?14 Is it a predictable and low
average CPI inflation rate – an inflation target? Is it a
predictable slowly rising trend in the CPI – a target
path for the price level? Or is it a constant CPI?
Most economists would say that a constant CPI
implies a falling price level – a rising value of money
– because of the bias in the CPI discussed above. The
| 6 Commentary 279
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Bank of Canada puts the upward bias of the CPI at
0.6 percent per year (see Rossiter 2005). So, if the
CPI rises at a constant 0.6 percent per year, the price
level and the value of money are stable. The current
2 percent target for the CPI implies a true inflation
rate of 1.4 percent per year, and to achieve price
stability, the average inflation rate would be lowered
to 0.6 percent per year. A number like 0.6 does not
have the magnetism of 2 or zero, and if true price
stability were the goal, it would be worth adjusting
the CPI for its known and approximately constant
bias, so that a zero inflation rate (or, for that matter,
a 2 percent inflation rate) would be measured as the
same number by the CPI.
If the ultimate goal is to be an average CPI
inflation rate of 0.6 percent per year (a true inflation
rate of zero), should we express that goal as an
inflation-rate target or a price-level-path target? And
how quickly should we aim to get to the new target?
An Inflation-Rate Target versus a Price-Level Target 
An inflation-targeting regime seeks to keep the
inflation rate inside a specified target range. A price-
level-targeting regime seeks to keep the price-level
path inside a specified target range. With an inflation
target, a missed target is a bygone. With a price-level-
path target, above (or below) target inflation must be
followed by below (or above) target inflation to keep
the average inflation rate equal to its target rate and
bring the price level back to its target path.
Much has been written about the relative merits of
targeting the inflation rate versus targeting the path
of the price level (see Côté 2007 for a useful survey).
This choice is independent of the choice of the
numerical target and has both long- and short-term
consequences.
LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES: Price-level targeting
provides a more predictable long-term value of
money, which takes on its greatest significance for
life-cycle consumption-smoothing saving decisions.
Working households must decide how much to save
for their retirement years, and retired households
must decide the rate at which to spend their
retirement wealth. These choices are difficult ones
because of the idiosyncratic risks that each household
faces – random shocks to individual economic and
physical health. But each household also faces
systemic risk that arises from uncertainty about the
future value of money. Targeting the price level,
rather than the inflation rate, lowers this risk. The
magnitude of the long-term risk, even from the
current inflation target, is probably not large, but it is
almost certainly large enough to be a concern. Its
exact magnitude can only be estimated conditional
on a model of the inflation process. Whatever the
magnitude of the risk, it is its cost that matters.
What are the costs of long-term price-level
uncertainty? In current conditions, the cost of
inflation protection for savings turns out to be a bit
less than half a percent a year. The average annual
yield on Government of Canada long-term bonds
between 1998 and 2008 was 5.2 percent and the
annual inflation rate averaged 1.8 percent, so the real
return was 3.4 percent. Over the same period, an
investment in a Government of Canada real bond
that avoids inflation risk yielded a return of 2.95
percent. So, over that decade, the annual cost of
avoiding inflation risk was 0.45 percent.15
Although this number is modest, its consequences
become significant over a working lifetime. If the
experience of the past 10 years were to repeat over
the next 40 years, a person who saved a constant
amount each year and avoided inflation risk by
investing in real bonds would end up with 10
percent less wealth than a person who saved the 
same amount but invested in nominal bonds.16
The cost of inflation protection after retirement by
indexing retirement income is much larger. Consider
an annuity to be paid for the life of the last survivor
of a couple. The year-one payment on an indexed
annuity is 62 percent of the year-one payment on a
nonindexed annuity. The current value (at 65) of the
payments stream to age 85 (life expectancy at 65) on
an indexed annuity is 73 percent that on a non-
15  Of course, we do not know that this differential measures only inflation risk and we do not know how small we can drive it by reducing inflation
uncertainty. My numbers are an upper limit.
16  The formula is, Wealth at retirement =                            where S is the constant annual payment, T is the final period (that is, 40), i is the index for
years, and r is the discount rate. Evaluating with r = 3.4 and r = 2.95, the latter is 90 percent of the former.| 8 Commentary 279
C.D. Howe Institute
indexed annuity. At this cost, only the most severely
risk-averse family would consider buying inflation
protection for its retirement income.17
While Howitt (2001) is clearly correct that more
research on this topic will pay dividends, it is
possible to conclude from the current body of
evidence that even today’s modest amount of
inflation uncertainty brings significant inefficiency
for life-cycle plans and that an explicit promise of a
price-level path would bring significant welfare gains.
SHORT-TERM CONSEQUENCES: Most of the literature
on price-level targeting versus inflation-rate targeting
has focused on short-term consequences. That lit-
erature is now large; fortunately, it is well summarized
by Ambler (2007) so it is possible to cut to the core
of the issues.
Before Svensson (1999), it was believed that price-
level targeting increases the volatility of the business
cycle. The reasoning was simple: if, starting from
being on target, the inflation rate rises, policy must
lower aggregate demand to send real GDP below
potential and keep it there long enough to lower the
average inflation rate back to target. Similarly, again
starting from being on target, if the inflation rate
falls, policy must boost aggregate demand to send
real GDP above potential and keep it there long
enough to raise the average inflation rate back to
target. In contrast, with no requirement to hit a
price-level path, an above-target (or below-target)
inflation rate is a bygone. All that policy needs to do
is keep inflation close to target, with no com-
pensation for past departures from target.
After Svensson (1999), it became clear that the
traditional reasoning was flawed and, more
important, that a free lunch is available from price-
level targeting. The earlier and incorrect line of
reasoning failed to take account of the effects of
policy on inflation expectations. With price-level-
path targeting, the long-term expected inflation rate
is anchored. Departures from the path are temporary
and the path inflation rate prevails. More interesting,
the short-term expected inflation rate moves in the
opposite direction to the actual inflation rate – an
unexpected increase in the inflation rate lowers the
expected inflation rate, because the price level must
return to its target path. With long-term inflation
expectations anchored and short-term inflation
expectations moving in the opposite direction to
unexpected inflation, one of the main sources of
inflation volatility is removed, since fluctuations in
inflation expectations bring one-for-one fluctuations
in the actual inflation rate. With this source of
inflation volatility eliminated, departures of inflation
from target are less severe and less frequent, so policy
actions that send output below or above potential are
needed less frequently, and when they occur, they
need not be as strong or as long lasting.
Further, and more important, with price-level-path
targeting, smaller fluctuations in inflation expec-
tations decrease the volatility of real GDP – the “free
lunch” that Svensson discovered. Smaller fluctuations
in inflation expectations bring smaller fluctuations in
aggregate supply, which, in turn, lead to smaller fluc-
tuations in both inflation and real GDP.
These conclusions turn on the commitment to a
price-level path’s being credible and believed. That
qualification is a real problem for a central bank
without a track record of delivering on its com-
mitment. For the Bank of Canada, however, with a
near 20-year record of delivering on its promises, it
seems reasonable to suppose that credibility would
not be a significant problem.
While the assumption of commitment cannot be
dropped, the free-lunch conclusion is robust to other
changes in assumptions. Svensson (1999) shows that
it holds for situations in which the central bank
targets the inflation rate or price level indirectly via
the control of a monetary aggregate or interest rate
instrument. Dittmar and Gavin (2000) show that
the free lunch is available in models based on either
classical or Keynesian assumptions of inflation expec-
tations and wage and price determination.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: What is the empirical evidence
on the performance of price-level-path targeting? In
Parkin (2000), I concluded from the then-available
evidence that it was favourable, noting the “free-
17  Based on quotations obtained by the author from leading Canadian companies. Fischer (1994) argues that a lack of markets for indexed assets and
annuities must mean that the cost of price level uncertainty is low. It is hard to reconcile that high price in the admittedly thin market with Fischer’s
conclusion.Commentary 279 | 9
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lunch” result holds in the Federal Reserve Board’s
large-scale open economy macroeconometric model
and appears in the work of Black, Macklem, and
Rose (1998). Results from work undertaken since
then are mixed, but do not reject the free-lunch
claim. Kryvtsov, Shukayev, and Ueberfeldt (2008)
measure the welfare effects of switching from
inflation targeting to price-level targeting in a model
in which private agents’ beliefs about the policy
switch change gradually. In their model, price-level
targeting improves economic welfare in the long run
but the gains are small. In the short run, imperfect
credibility leads to costs that are never fully recovered
by the long-run benefits. The faster the new policy
becomes credible, the smaller are the transition costs.
Coletti, Lalonde, and Muir (2008) use a two-
country model in which they compare the
performance of inflation targeting and price-level
targeting with a set of shocks that mimic those expe-
rienced by Canada and the United States from 1983
to 2004. They conclude that price-level targeting is
slightly preferred to inflation targeting as it lowers
the volatility of inflation at the expense of only a
slight increase in output gap variability.
While Kryvtsov, Shukayev, and Ueberfeldt cast
some doubt on the cost of switching, even their
work is positive in the case of a credible regime
switch. All the other work supports a price-level
target over an inflation-rate target. Smith (1998)
argues that “there is considerable historical
experience with price-level targeting” that is
unfavourable to the practice. But the experience that
he considers is the attempt by the United Kingdom
in 1926 to force a destabilizing deflation and return
to the gold standard. This episode is an example of
what happens when the price level is not targeted.18
The Adjustment Path
I have suggested that a constant price level19 would
provide the ideal monetary policy goal. I do not
believe, however, that it would be wise to move to
this target in one single step when the Bank of
Canada’s mandate is renewed in 2011. Two aspects
of reaching this goal are relevant: moving from an
inflation rate to a price-level-path target; and
lowering the target inflation rate from 2 percent to
0.6 percent.
MOVING FROM INFLATIONTARGETINGTO PRICE-LEVEL
TARGETING: The move from inflation targeting to
price-level targeting is not a very big one, and it
might have been under way, unannounced and
unconsciously, for some time.20Two pieces of
evidence point to this view: the language used in a
succession of Joint Statements of the federal gov-
ernment and the Bank of Canada, and the behaviour
of the CPI.
In Joint Statements, the language that describes
the inflation-control target has changed in ways that
seem nuanced but perhaps contain a significant
message. Qualitative vagueness in the 1991, 1993,
and 1998 statements was replaced by quantitative
precision in the 2001 and 2006 statements.
The 1993 statement had envisioned that 1998
would see a major evaluation of what constitutes
price stability and most likely a downward
adjustment of the inflation-control target. But when
1998 arrived, the Bank was not ready to take that
step. “It would be helpful,” the 1998 Joint Statement
asserts, “to have a longer period of time in which the
economy demonstrated more fully its ability to
perform well under conditions of low inflation
before determining the appropriate long-run target
consistent with price stability.”
Qualitative language was more prominent than
quantitative language. For example, “Monetary
policy actions will continue to focus on countering
persistent upward or downward pressures on the
trend rate of inflation, not temporary pressures that
are expected to reverse, or one-off price level
changes.” And, “In the case …inflation … tem-
18  Historically, only Sweden’s Riksbank has practised price-level targeting; for two years, 1931-33, the targeting was clean, with a flexible exchange rate,
and, it is widely agreed, delivered one of the best real economic performances. While this episode has limited relevance for today’s debate, it does serve
to place the United Kingdom’s return to the gold standard in perspective and highlight the irrelevance of that episode. See Fisher (1935); Jonung
(1979); Black and Gavin (1990); Bernanke (1995); Lundberg (1996); Berg and Jonung (1998); and Dittmar, Gavin, and Kydland (1999).
19  Equivalent to the currently measured CPI rising by 0.6 percent per year on average.
20 Charles Freedman, former deputy governor of the Bank of Canada, and John Murray, the current deputy governor, are quite sure that no such move
was explicit either in the minds or the discussions of those responsible for policy during this period. Nonetheless, the evidence to which I point can be
interpreted as suggesting an unconscious evolution.| 10 Commentary 279
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porarily move[s] outside the target range, monetary
policy actions would then be directed to bringing the
trend rate of inflation back towards the centre of the
range over a period of about two years.” Also, “policy
actions must always be directed to responding to
expected developments in inflation six to eight
quarters in the future.”
But by 2001, the language was bold and uncom-
promising: “The inflation-control target range will
continue to be 1 to 3 per cent; and within this range
monetary policy will continue to aim at keeping the
trend of inflation at the 2 per cent target midpoint,”
the first mention of such a commitment. By 2006,
the 2 percent midpoint precedes the 1-to-3 percent
range: “The inflation target will continue to be the 2
per cent mid-point of the 1 to 3 per cent inflation-
control range.”
I interpret this evolution of language as indicating
an increasingly clear commitment to a 2 percent
inflation target with even a hint that the uncon-
sciously preferred implicit target is a 2 percent trend
in the price level – price-level targeting. And, as
Figure 3 shows, the behaviour of the CPI is con-
sistent with price-level-path targeting. Kamenik et al.
(2008) compare two hypotheses about the behaviour
of the CPI: that positive and negative shocks to
inflation exactly offset each other, and that the Bank
of Canada is actually targeting the CPI path, and
find that the latter cannot be ruled out.
LOWERINGTHE INFLATIONTARGET: Lowering the
inflation target cannot be done lightly. It would take
some time for lower inflation expectations to
influence price and wage setting. so an abrupt fall in
the inflation target and actual inflation rate would
almost certainly bring on a recession. More
important, millions of Canadians have made long-
term plans based on an expectation of a 2 percent
inflation rate. If inflation were lowered to around 0.5
percent and kept at that rate on the average, a large
amount of wealth redistribution would occur as bond
prices and interest rates adjusted to the new reality.
This second consequence of lowering the inflation
target calls for even more caution than the first. In
the light of these considerations, it would be
imprudent to lower the target in 2011. The
entrenched 2 percent expectation should be validated
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Figure 3: The Price-Level Path, Canada, 1995–2007
Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 326-0022.redistribution. But it would be appropriate for the
2011 Joint Statement to acknowledge that 2 percent
inflation is not price stability and that it is intended,
over a period of a decade, to move to a lower
inflation rate. Intermediate targets might be set, like
those of the early 1990s: a target of 1.5 percent by
2016, 1.0 percent by 2021, and 0.6 percent by 2026
would be feasible and would permit long-term
planning and avoid capricious wealth redistribution.
What is the Best Policy Instrument?
What is the appropriate instrument for monetary
policy to use, and how should it be set? The Bank of
Canada, in principle, can target any of three
variables: the overnight rate, the monetary base, or
the exchange rate. For a very small open economy,
the exchange rate (or better, abolishing the national
currency and using that of a major trading partner) is
the clear winner. But for a large economy like
Canada’s, fixing the exchange rate is the worst choice,
and the Bank of Canada rightly has been a long-
standing advocate of a freely floating dollar. The key
reason fixing – or even targeting a path for – the
exchange rate is inappropriate is the impossibility of
distinguishing, until long after the event, equilibrium
changes in the real exchange rate, which need to be
permitted, and speculative movements, which are
best avoided. Leaving the market to determine the
exchange rate, while imperfect, is the best that can be
achieved. So the effective choice comes down to the
overnight rate versus the monetary base.
The Interest Rate or the Monetary Base? 
The Bank of Canada’s unequivocal choice of the
interest-rate instrument, shared by all central banks,
regardless of whether they are inflation targeters, is a
consequence of history and economic reasoning.
History is at work because the interest rate was the
natural policy tool for maintaining the gold value of
money. Raising and lowering the interest rate enabled
reserves to be maintained at a level that instilled con-
fidence in the (gold) value of money. When fiat
money replaced the gold standard (and gold exchange
standard), the familiar tool continued to be used.
At first, economic reasoning cast doubt on the
viability of interest-rate targeting. A fixed interest rate
with fiat money leaves the price level indeterminate,
and an interest rate set too low brings accelerating
inflation. In the Keynesian world of a given money
wage rate or, more extreme, a fixed price level, the
choice between setting the interest rate and fixing the
quantity of money – or monetary base – becomes a
standard tradeoff issue.
The seminal work of Poole (1970) provided the
intellectual foundation for thinking about this
tradeoff. Roughly, if the demand for real GDP is too
unpredictable, fixing the quantity of money leads to
interest-rate fluctuations that dampen the fluc-
tuations in real demand for goods and services. But if
the demand for money is too unpredictable, fixing
the quantity of money leads to unwanted fluc-
tuations in the interest rate that accentuate the
fluctuations in real demand. In this case, fixing the
interest rate and avoiding the unwanted interest-rate
fluctuations is preferred. Unpredictable changes in
the demand for money arising from financial
innovation seemed strongly to favour interest-rate,
rather than money-stock, targeting.
Another swing of the intellectual pendulum
occurred with the rational expectations revolution. If
money prices, such as the money wage rate, depend
on the rational expectation of the price level,
something must pin down the price level. A given
quantity of money does the job, but a given interest
rate does not – with a given interest rate, any
quantity of money and any price level are possible.
The pendulum swung back quickly. In Parkin
(1978), I showed that price-level targeting provides
the “something” to pin down the price level even
with an interest-rate-setting policy. But it was not
until the work of Taylor (1993a, 1993b) that the
requirements of interest-rate setting were as
thoroughly understood as they are today (for a
thorough review of current ideas, see Woodford
2003). In a nutshell, interest-rate setting works
provided it obeys the “Taylor principle,” which may
be stated in two equivalent ways:
￿ if the inflation rate rises (falls), the real interest
rate must rise (fall); or
￿ with the neutral real interest rate [explained
below] unchanged, if the inflation rate rises
(falls), the nominal interest rate must rise (fall)
by a greater amount than the change in the
inflation rate.
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The reasoning here is that interest-rate setting must
counter the direction of change of the inflation rate
and keep bringing inflation (or the price level) back to
its target. Interest-rate setting that violates the Taylor
principle eventually will lead to massive price-level
instability – either hyperinflation or severe deflation.
Ensuring that the interest rate satisfies the Taylor
principle places some restriction on appropriate
interest-rate decisions. But the restriction does not
deliver a unique decision: the Bank of Canada has a
great deal of scope in choosing the interest-rate level
and in the process it uses to choose, but it does not
have unlimited discretion. Its decisions lead to better
economic performance if it uses a rule.
A Rule, but Which Rule?
Discretionary monetary policy is dominated by a
rules-based policy because “[m]onetary policy is fun-
damentally about managing inflation expectations”
(Woodford 2003, 15). Expectations might not be
fully rational but they are not consciously irrational.
In forming expectations about monetary policy and
its consequences, market participants in all types of
markets – assets, goods, and labour – do their best to
predict what the Bank of Canada is going to do at the
upcoming sequence of interest-rate decision dates.
Monetary policy rules fall into two broad groups:
instrument rules and targeting rules.21
AN INSTRUMENT RULE: An instrument rule is a
decision rule that sets the monetary policy
instrument at a level that is based on the current
state of the economy as described by the values of all
the variables deemed relevant to influencing the
policy target as well as the current forecasts of those
variables. A fixed formula translates the state of the
economy into a decision.
The “Taylor rule” – of which there are many
variants – is the best-known instrument rule. In its
simplest form, it is based on the view that only four
variables are relevant for setting the overnight rate, R.
They are the neutral real overnight rate, R*; the
inflation rate, B; the target inflation rate, B*; and the
output gap, G. Again in its simplest form, the rule
uses the current actual values of the inflation rate and
output gap, but a variant of the rule might use
forecasts of these variables. In its original form, the
rule is to set the overnight rate at
R = R* + B + 0.5(B – B*) + 0.5G.
The neutral real overnight rate is the level at which
monetary policy is neither adding to nor subtracting
from aggregate demand. This level of the overnight
rate must be inferred either from a formal
econometric model or by less formal judgments.
Either way, a guess is involved – about the right
model or about the right value for the neutral real
rate. Taylor suggested that the historical average real
rate be used, which he put at 2 percent.22Making a
guess about the neutral real interest rate is not special
to using the Taylor rule but an inevitable con-
sequence of using an interest-rate instrument. The
Bank of Canada has no way of dodging that guess,
for it is the level of the overnight rate relative to its
neutral level that determines whether monetary
policy is restraining or stimulating aggregate
demand. This fact is sometimes overlooked when the
immediate concern is whether to raise, lower, or not
change the interest rate. Raising the rate means
restraining aggregate demand only if it moves above
the neutral level. Raising the rate below the neutral
level merely weakens the degree of stimulation.
Likewise, lowering the rate means stimulating
aggregate demand only if it moves below the neutral
level. Lowering the rate above the neutral level
merely weakens the degree of restraint.
The output and inflation variables in the Taylor
rule formula might be actual current values or
forecast values over the policy horizon. When they
are forecasts, the central bank must be explicit about
what the forecasts are and how they were arrived at,
so that independent observers are able to replicate
the forecasts and ensure that the rule is entirely
transparent.
The weights in the Taylor rule formula need not
be the ones originally suggested by Taylor, but they
21  The dichotomy was suggested by Svensson (2003) and led to a spirited discussion between Svensson (2005) and McCallum and Nelson (2005) about
the normative superiority of the two types of rules.
22  Taylor’s 2 percent refers to the US economy; perfect capital mobility would imply the same real rate for Canada.
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principle. Notice that the principle is well satisfied in
the above formula: a 1 percentage point change in
the inflation rate brings a 1.5 percentage point
change in the same direction in the overnight rate
and a 0.5 percent change in the same direction in the
real overnight rate. As long as the interest rate reacts
strongly enough to the inflation rate, the rule satisfies
the Taylor principle.
So long as the Taylor principle is satisfied, the
weight on the output gap can be as large (or small) as
desired. The presence of the output gap in the
formula can represent two concerns. First, poli-
cymakers need to be mindful of the real cost of
output fluctuations and the political environment in
which monetary policy is made, so even though the
goal is price stability and even though monetary
policy is incapable of influencing the level of real
GDP on the average, it is prudent to place some
weight on directly smoothing output fluctuations as
an objective of policy. Second, to the extent that
future inflation responds to the current output gap,
making the interest rate respond to the output gap is
equivalent to targeting future inflation.
The weights in the Taylor rule formula need not
be constant: they might vary to reflect the degree of
confidence in forecasts and an asymmetric
assessment of the balance of risk. If the Bank is
confident of its forecast of the output gap but has a
large range of uncertainty on its forecast of inflation,
it might increase the weight on the gap and lower its
weight on inflation. Neither must the weights in the
formula be linear. A positive output gap brings rising
inflation and a negative output gap brings falling
inflation, but the response of inflation to the output
gap might be asymmetric – there might be a greater
response to a positive gap than to a negative one. If
this is indeed the case, then the interest-rate response
to a positive output gap might be larger than its
response to a negative output gap.
Allowing that the instrument rule might have
variable and nonlinear weights makes such a rule
very close to a targeting rule.
ATARGETING RULE: A targeting rule is a decision rule
that sets the policy instrument at the level that makes
the forecast of the policy target(s) equal to the
target(s). In the case of a policy that targets the
inflation rate two years ahead, a targeting rule sets the
overnight rate and its two-year forecast path to make
the inflation-rate forecast equal to the target rate.
A targeting rule is more complicated to describe
than an instrument rule. It is a complex deci-
sionmaking process that uses a large amount of data,
alternative models of the transmission mechanism
and comparisons among them and checks for
robustness, models of the partly random processes
that govern the exogenous variables, and a delib-
eration process that pools the views and ideas of a
wide range of experts.
Unlike an instrument rule, a targeting rule must
include a forecast of the path of the policy
instrument. Deciding only the current setting of
the policy instrument is not sufficient to generate
the required forecast of the target variable – the
entire path of the instrument influences the target,
and alternative instrument paths might achieve the
same objective. For example, if, in the absence of
an interest-rate increase, inflation is expected to
rise, it might be possible to lower inflation to its
target with an initially large jump in the interest
rate followed by a gradual decrease or by an initial
small jump followed by a sequence of further
increases. These alternative planned paths must be
considered and the best one (on some criterion)
chosen. But even the best path remains a forecast;
it will change as currently unexpected future 
events occur.
The description of a targeting rule makes it
sound like discretion, but there is a crucial dif-
ference. Under discretion, the central bank selects
its target and the means of achieving it. Under a
targeting rule, the central bank pursues a known
target – announced in advance and mandated, self-
imposed, or arising from an agreement between
the bank and government – and uses discretion
constrained by the requirement to pursue the target.
The pursuit of a targeting rule does not preclude
the need to satisfy the Taylor principle. Any instru-
ment-setting arrangement that ignores that
principle leaves the economy at risk to bubbles 
and busts.
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other inflation-targeting central banks, a targeting
rule beats an instrument rule. The reasons are
probably close to those supplied by Svensson, who
puts it thus:
With improved understanding of the trans-
mission mechanism of monetary policy,
increased experience, and better-designed
objectives for monetary policy, central banks
believe that they can do better than follow these
mechanical simple rules. They have developed
complex decision processes, where huge amounts
of data are collected, processed, and analyzed.
They construct forecasts of their target variables,
typically inflation and the output gap, con-
ditional on their view of the transmission
mechanism, their estimate of the current state of
the economy and the development of a number
of exogenous variables, and alternative
instrument rate paths. They select and
implement an instrument rate or instrument rate
path such that the corresponding forecasts of the
targeting variables “look good” relative to the
objectives of the central bank. (2005, p. 615.)
In a nutshell, central banks know enough about
how the overnight rate influences the inflation rate
to be able to use that knowledge at their discretion to
hit the inflation target. And they can beat
“mechanical simple rules.” Using its discretion, the
Bank of Canada can take account of term structure
issues, expectations about the marginal product of
capital and the long-term real interest rate,
temporary changes in the exchange rate, and a host
of other factors deemed relevant that are omitted
from a simple rule.
Many other economists who have thought hard
about this question, however, prefer an instrument
rule. Starting with Taylor (1993a), it has been shown
repeatedly23 that the efficiency frontier for a well-
chosen “simple mechanical rule” beats the historical
performance of central bank decisions. The specific
rule that does the best job varies across countries and
over time, and this general survey of the issues is not
the place to take a stand on the specific form of the
winning rule – that must come from ongoing
research.
The idea that a simple mechanical instrument rule
might outperform the sophisticated decisionmaking
process described in the above quotation from
Svensson seems outrageous. But after some thought,
it becomes clear that what is much less credible is the
idea that the deliberations of a committee might out-
perform the data-crunching capacity of a
computer.24
Of course, the targeting-rule decisionmaking
process described by Svensson is highly sophisticated
and makes much use of data and computing power.
It is at the end of the process that it eschews the
methods it relies so heavily on in its initial stages.
Pulling all the threads together in a number of
human brains and then sharing views in committee
deliberation is a high-risk and imprecise activity. It is
fraught with the problem of overconfidence, well
known to psychologists. In contrast, for the realist
instrument-rule user, the number crunching does
not stop with forecasts of inflation and the output
gap, conditional on alternative instrument paths and
the selection of an interest rate path that “looks
good” relative to the objectives.
The best instrument rule is selected not to be
optimal but to be robust – to deliver good average
performance and to avoid disasters. Robustness is
arrived at and checked by comparing the per-
formance of alternative rules in a wide variety of
models that span the range of beliefs about the
monetary policy transmission mechanism (see, for
example, Côté et al. 2002). It is in this activity that
we cannot (and should not) replace the human deci-
sionmaker.
C.D. Howe Institute
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23  For a sample of these studies, see Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1998).
24  Ian Ayres’s provocative book, Super Crunchers (2007), provides dozens of examples of situations in which the “expert” has yielded to the computer.
One such is an econometric investigation by Orly Ashenfelter that produced an index of wine quality with only three variables: winter rainfall, average
growing season temperature, and harvest rainfall. The index was described by the world’s most influential wine expert as “an absolute total sham” until
it accurately predicted the price of fine Bordeaux wines before they had even been tasted and more accurately than the experts. In another example, a
statistical contribution index proved a more reliable way of spotting baseball hitting talent than sending experts to games. In medicine, marketing,
moviemaking, and many other areas, as Ayres puts it, “[w]e are in a historic moment of horse-versus-locomotive competition, where intuition and
experiential expertise is losing out time and time again to number crunching.”Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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TRANSITIONTO A RULE: If it is granted that an
instrument rule beats a targeting rule, it does not
follow that a switch should be made with any haste.
In the current state of knowledge, sound monetary
policy decisionmaking will use an instrument rule –
in its currently best available form – and will take the
decision that it delivers as the starting point for dis-
cussion. Departures from the rule will be justified by
arguments that explain why, in the current situation,
pertinent available information demands deviating
from the rule’s decision. It is difficult to imagine
what such information might be, especially if the
rule uses the best available forecasts of inflation, the
output gap, and any other variable(s) deemed
relevant. But it might be appropriate to allow for a
low-probability but large-impact event or to place a
temporarily greater weight on either inflation or the
output gap for some specified and plausible reason.
Also, a situation of unusual uncertainty might make
policymakers want to move more cautiously than
would the instrument rule. Alternatively, concern
about future inflation or the future output gap might
make policymakers want to move more aggressively
than would the rule. A departure from a simple rule
might also be rationalized as a response to potential
credit market problems, a matter I address in the
final section of this Commentary.
Whatever the reason for departing from the rule,
by making its choice relative to a well-defined and
well-understood instrument rule, the central bank
brings clarity to its decision.
How Should the Central Bank
Communicate? 
How a central bank explains its decisions depends
crucially on how it makes them. It is not possible to
have clarity in communications and explanations if
the policy process is itself mysterious, even to the
policymakers. It is possible, and extremely desirable,
to explain policy decisions where they emerge from a
deliberate and well-defined set of procedures, but the
explanation will depend on whether the central bank
uses a targeting-rule decision process or an
instrument rule.
Explaining Targeting-Rule Decisions
Because central banks today use targeting rules, we
have a rich body of data on how communications
and explanations vary across countries. All the
inflation-targeting central banks produce a detailed
report on the current and forecast macroeconomic
situation in their countries and explain their most
recent interest-rate decisions. Three reports are
especially noteworthy: the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand’s Monetary Policy Statement, the Bank of
England’s Inflation Report, and the Bank of Canada’s
Monetary Policy Report.
There is much to admire in the Bank of Canada’s
report. The one-page summary that appears as the
first page of the report, “Canada’s Inflation-Control
Strategy,” explains why Canada targets inflation and
how it influences and monitors inflation; it is a
superbly succinct statement that bears its twice-a-
year repetition. The report is well organized and
provides almost all the information that well-
informed Canadians need to understand the Bank’s
policy choices. Significantly, however, the report
differs from those of the New Zealand and UK
central banks in the way it presents interest-rate
forecasts and in the way it describes forecast
uncertainty.
INTEREST-RATE FORECASTS: All three central banks
forecast three crucial variables that Svensson calls the
Trinity: the inflation rate, the output gap, and
nominal interest rates. All three banks publish
forecasts of the first two variables, but only the
Reserve Bank of New Zealand publishes an interest-
rate forecast.25The other two indicate the likely
future direction of interest rate-change, but do not
provide details of their forecasts.
The reluctance of central banks to publish an
interest-rate forecast is not unreasonable – a forecast
can be misunderstood as an intention, and it might
exert too strong an influence on market expectations.
But market participants do forecast the interest rate.
And knowing the current forecast of the central bank
rather than guessing it surely improves the
information available to financial markets and
removes one source of uncertainty.
25  In recent years, some other central banks have started to publish interest-rate forecasts – namely, those of Norway (beginning in 2005), Sweden
(2007), Iceland (2007), and the Czech Republic (2008).| 16 Commentary 279
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The C.D. Howe Institute Monetary Policy
Council has wrestled with how to formulate its own
outlook for the interest rate, and since May 2007 has
published three sets of numbers: the current recom-
mendation, the expected recommendation at the
next rate setting, and the expected recommendation
six months to one year in the future. The for-
mulation is carefully deliberated and is described
thus: “if my current recommendation is
implemented and if there are no intervening major
new unexpected shocks, I expect to be recom-
mending x percent at the next meeting and y percent
at meetings six to twelve months in the future.” The
council’s next-meeting forecast is intended to convey
information about the direction in which members
think policy needs to move in the near term, and the
longer-horizon number is designed to indicate the
policy pressure that will still be needed mid-way
towards the current policy horizon.
If the Bank of Canada matched its C.D. Howe
Institute shadow, it would not need the qualifier, “if
my current recommendation is implemented.” Thus,
the Bank might publish two numbers, qualified by
“if no currently unexpected shocks occur, the Bank
expects to move the overnight rate to x percent at its
next meeting and y percent at meetings six to twelve
months in the future.” Such a statement would
clearly be a forecast, not a commitment, and would
simplify the guessing game that occupies a good deal
of the market’s intellectual capacity. It is hard to see
the losses but easy to see the gains from such an
innovation.26
FORECAST UNCERTAINTY: The special feature of the
Bank of England’s report is the way in which it
provides forecasts of inflation and real GDP growth.
Its forecasts of both these variables are conditional on
a constant interest rate – the currently set rate – and
on market expectations of the interest rate. The
report also provides the distribution of forecasts in
the form of a set of fan charts (see Britton, Fisher,
and Whitley 1998); in contrast, the other two
central banks publish point values for forecasts and
qualitative verbal discussions of the directions and
severity of risks.
While the thoroughness of the Bank of England’s
forecasting exercise is impressive and the intellectual
integrity of its fan charts unimpeachable, the practical
gain from providing this detail might be questioned.
The fan charts show that the variances of the forecast
distributions are large and that the spread around the
mean does not vary a great deal relative to variation in
the mean. The effective information content of the fan
charts are their central forecasts, which is precisely the
forecast data reported by the other central banks.
The Bank of Canada is wise to avoid seductive fan
charts. They emphasize uncertainty, and they do not
incorporate the fact that the Bank will act when the
future turns out to be different from its current
expectation. There is no gain from publishing proba-
bilities when everyone knows that the future is
uncertain but no one knows just how uncertain. The
goal of monetary policy is not to emphasize future
uncertainty but to lessen it. It is much more
informative for the policy report to state the bank’s
central forecast for inflation, the output gap, and the
interest rate over the next eight quarters, given no
future shocks. For inflation, the target is the forecast.
The report needs to be unequivocal in stating that, no
matter what shocks occur, policy actions will be taken
to keep inflation on target over the medium term and
to minimize the variability of output consistent with
the price-level objective.
Explaining Instrument-Rule Decisions
There are no live examples of the use and reporting
of instrument-decision rules by central banks, but it
is not difficult to envisage how such decisions would
be communicated and explained: the rule itself
would be public knowledge, the reason for the rule
would be explained, and the current state of the
economy and current forecasts from which the rule
formula calculates the instrument setting would be
published, just as they are in today’s set-up.
An instrument rule provides two gains for com-
municating and explaining monetary policy: it shifts
the focus from forecasting time series to under-
standing the means and variances that the rule
delivers, and it removes the need to provide a
forecast of the interest rate. The rule itself and
26  Freedman (2000) believes that the market has had some difficulty distinguishing a forecast from a promise.Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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27  I am not claiming that the Taylor principle must be applied at each and every rate-setting moment; rather, that it must be respected on the average. A
persistent upsurge in the inflation rate that is not accompanied by a larger rise in the interest rate is a worrisome indicator of the violation of the
principle.
28  My treatment of this topic is selective and focused on the interaction between the pursuit of an inflation target and the need to maintain financial
stability. Freedman and Goodlet (2007) provide a useful general definition of financial stability and a broader discussion of a central bank’s role in
promoting or restoring it. Illing and Ying Liu (2003) provide an interesting index of financial stress that might offer a concrete way of anticipating
when financial stability is at risk.
29  These goals might not always be inconsistent; the question discussed here becomes relevant when they are so.
current forecasts of inflation and real GDP provide
all the information market participants need to
predict the next policy rate change. If the rule is
changed, as it very infrequently would be when new
research leads to the discovery of a better rule, the
new rule and reason for the change would be
explained well in advance of using it.
Even if the central bank does not use an instrument
rule to make its decisions, it can use the rule to explain
its decisions, both to itself and to the wider public –
for example, the US Federal Reserve uses the Taylor
rule in the internal deliberations of the Federal Open
Market Committee (see Yellen 2007).
Some Missing Ingredients 
Missing from all central bank monetary policy reports
– not just those of the three banks singled out for
special attention but others as well – is an explicit
recognition that interest-rate setting must satisfy the
Taylor principle. Monetary policy that violates this
principle does so at its peril, yet the recent upsurge in
the inflation rate around the world suggests that the
principle has been absent not only from monetary
policy reports, but also from monetary policy.27
The Bank of Canada and other major central
banks that are presiding over rising inflation should
be explaining that they have inappropriately permit-
ted the real interest rate to fall as the inflation rate has
increased, when instead they should have been raising
the real interest rate. Equivalently, the nominal
interest rate has been set too low for too long. Today’s
inflation was caused by monetary policy decisions
made up to two years ago. It is necessary to explain
why those decisions turned out to be wrong. There is
no shame in not having perfect foresight – there is
shame in pretending that no mistakes were made.
When inflation is outside the target range, we
need to know whether this is because of some
unforeseen random event that can be expected to
reverse itself or because of a systematic event that
must be addressed. We also need to know if there is a
systemic flaw, such as using an inappropriate model
of the transmission mechanism.
Another missing ingredient of monetary policy
reports is the Taylor curve (of Figure 1), which
should be calculated from the best available models,
with inflation and output controlled by the best
available policy rule. Reports also need to show
where the banks are currently operating in the Taylor
curve space, and where they are operating compared
to other central banks.
Unwanted Distraction
There is a tendency, when inflation is outside the
target range, to distract attention from the true reason.
Instead of recognizing that the problem arises because
monetary policy over the past two years has been too
accommodating, monetary policy reports point to the
prices of oil and grain as the culprits. Yet, when
monetary policy is working well and hitting its targets,
central banks do not say, “oil prices and grain prices
are rising at the target inflation rate and keeping
inflation on track.” Nor should they misleadingly say
that the source of an increase in the inflation rate is a
faster rise in the price of oil or grain. Relative prices
change. Today’s increases in the relative prices of oil
and grain would have occurred at a slower nominal
pace in the company of faster falling nominal prices of
computers and flat-panel televisions if monetary
policy had been less inflationary.
What Role in Financial Stability? 
What role should monetary policy play in coping
with a financial crisis?28 Should it take pre-emptive
actions aimed at preventing or at least moderating
the crisis? When the crisis occurs, should the goal of
price stability take second place to the more urgent
task of containing financial stress and easing credit
flows?29| 18 Commentary 279
The standard way of addressing economic policy
questions like this is to draw on a body of general
theory and apply it to the given situation. But on the
generation and cure of credit market collapse, we
have no theory to apply, no model economies we can
use to generate a credit crisis and check on the ability
of alternative treatments to prevent or cure it.
The finance literature on asset and credit markets
and derivatives – the markets for the types of asset-
backed securities that played a dominant role in the
post-August 2007 meltdown – is extensive. Much
has been learned and written about the random
events that determine the returns on these instru-
ments and about the formulas for calculating the
prices of these instruments But there is no general
equilibrium macroeconomic model that incorporates
these instruments – their prices and quantities – into
the broader story of consumption and investment
decisions. There is no model of the linkages between
the markets for money – the monetary base and
bank deposits – and the markets for asset-backed
securities and credit derivatives. So we have no
models that explain how these markets influence
aggregate demand, real GDP, and inflation, and how
they influence the monetary policy transmission
mechanism.
Macroeconomic models that incorporate a financial
sector30 provide some insights, but the financial
sectors in these models are primitive. Also, these
models do not generate a financial crisis; rather, they
incorporate an exogenous asset price bubble that
creates a crisis when it bursts. The conclusion that
emerges from these exogenous crisis models is that
pre-emption does not help. Indeed, with an inflation
target, the asset price bubble to some extent should be
accommodated and the inflation target loosened (see
Selody and Wilkins 2007).
In contrast, Cecchetti, Genberg, and Wadhwani
(2003) argue that policy improvements are available if
flexible inflation targeting responds to asset price
bubbles. A key reason their conclusion differs from
that of the exogenous bubble models is the precise
question that is posed. Bernanke and Gertler ask
whether asset-price targeting is better than price-level
targeting; the unsurprising answer is that it is not.
Cecchetti, Genberg, and Wadhwani, in contrast,
compare inflation targeting that is oblivious to asset
prices with inflation targeting that responds to and
seeks to some degree to lean against asset price bubbles.
What emerges from a dispassionate evaluation of these
two lines of enquiry is that asset-price targeting is a bad
idea, and a flexible inflation-targeting regime that
places some weight on asset prices might be superior to
one that ignores asset prices.
In the work just reviewed, asset price bubbles are
exogenous. But suppose that monetary policy is partly
responsible for an asset price bubble. Borio and Lowe
(2002) argue that, when monetary policy achieves a
low and stable inflation rate, it becomes more likely
that excess demand pressure will be felt sooner in
credit and asset markets than in goods and factor
markets. An examination of the build-up to both the
2007 crisis and its 1997 dot-com predecessor
reinforces Borio and Lowe’s argument that a causal
link might indeed run from monetary policy to
bubble to crisis.
Two variables tell an interesting story: the price of
risk and the price of housing.
Taking the historical average price of risk31 as a
crude estimate of its long-run equilibrium, fluctuations
around the long run seem to have monetary policy
origins. The data are characterized by relatively long
periods when the price of risk is moderately below
average followed by short periods when the price spikes
upward substantially above average. Two episodes in
recent history are remarkably similar: from 1991
through 1996 and from 2001 into 2006, the price of
risk was below average. During the 2000s episode, the
price of risk was close to zero. In 1997-98 and in 2007-
08, the price of risk shot upward. During both
low-risk-price periods, the US policy interest rate, the
federal funds rate, was close to the inflation rate – a real
federal funds rate of zero – and when the price of risk
increased, the federal funds rate had risen sharply.
Two episodes and a loose association of the price
of risk with monetary policy is a weak straw on
which to hang a conclusion. But the data are sug-
gestive of a linkage and a potential danger for
monetary policy to watch out for. When the price of
risk is below its long-term average for a prolonged
period, trouble might be brewing, and it might be
time to tighten monetary policy even when the tra-
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ditional output gap and core inflation indicators
suggest that all is well.
The ratio of the median price of a home to
median income provides an estimate of the long-
run-equilibrium price of housing. Looking at the US
data, this ratio was around 4 until 1980. It increased
to a bit more than 5 for a year in the late 1980s but
then settled down to around 4.7 for the rest of the
1980s, the 1990s, and into 2000. Starting in 2001,
the ratio began to rise. The rate of increase became
rapid, and by 2005, when the ratio peaked, it was
6.3. Starting in 2006, the ratio began to fall and by
2007 it was below 6 and falling sharply. These
movements in the relative price of housing are cor-
related with monetary policy. Low interest rates feed
into the housing market via the mortgage market
and bring an increase in demand that exceeds the
capacity to increase supply. When house prices are
rising especially rapidly, we have another sign that
monetary policy might be too loose.
Reacting to signs of a future credit crisis with pre-
emptive monetary policy tightening seems to run
counter to the primacy of an inflation target. But, as
Crockett notes:
A willingness to contemplate pre-emptive
tightening would not require a redefinition of
ultimate objectives. Assuming the cost in terms of
the traditional objectives, such as inflation and
output, is the correct way of thinking about the
problem. But it should be recalled that even in
strict inflation targeting regimes concerns with
output performance are incorporated through the
length of the horizon and the trajectory chosen to
return the inflation rate to within its target range,
following an external shock. (2003, p. 6.)
There is a further reason pre-emptive tightening is
not contrary to inflation (or price-level) targeting: it
avoids the need to loosen policy at a time of
potential inflationary bias and so, over the longer
term, makes it more likely that the inflation target
will be met. Again, Crockett puts it well: “lowering
rates when problems materialise but failing to raise
them when they build up could promote an
insidious form of ‘moral hazard’, which could
actually contribute to generating the problem in the
first place” (2003, p. 5).
Pre-emption clearly would need to be done with
caution and care. It is uncommon for all asset
markets to point in the same direction – the house
price bubble was not accompanied by a major stock
price bubble. In pricking the house bubble, we
would need to avoid sending the stock market into a
speculative dive.
So far, I have focused on prevention. I now
consider cure. Should monetary policy modify its
near-term inflation target and tolerate a higher
inflation rate to try to limit the fall in asset prices?
The answer is, absolutely not. When the 1998 Joint
Statement said “[t]he best contribution monetary
policy can make to…[economic welfare] is through
preserving confidence in the value of money by
providing an environment of stable average prices,” it
did not mean only when times are good. Indeed, the
statement might have been qualified by adding “and
especially in times of turmoil, enhanced uncertainty,
and credit market crisis.”
A credit crisis makes forecasting difficult. Models of
aggregate demand provide linkages from asset values
to spending plans, and in a credit crisis the real GDP
growth rate will be correctly forecast to slow. But
models of aggregate supply are silent on how a credit
crisis affects potential GDP. The output of the
financial sector is clearly affected, but by how much
and even in which direction is not easy to pin down,
so the forecast of the output gap is especially
uncertain. Forecasting inflation is also more chal-
lenging, primarily because of the difficulty of
forecasting the effect of any policy toward the credit
situation on inflation expectations. The last thing that
monetary policy should do in a situation of enhanced
uncertainty is depart from well-tried and well-
understood rules-based decisions. Even Bernanke and
Gertler (1999), who believe that asset price crashes do
their worst and sustained damage when monetary
policy is either neutral or reinforcing of deflationary
tendencies, do not recommend abandoning the
inflation or price-level target. But they do recommend
a lower interest rate and easing credit markets with the
provision of additional liquidity.
If interest-rate decisions continue to target
inflation, should they nonetheless react to tight
credit markets and, in particular, to the price of risk?
If short-term interest rates are, say, 50 basis points
higher than normal because of an increase in the
price of risk, should the overnight rate be set 50 basis
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points lower than normal to offset the higher price of
risk? Reasoning from a simple view of an “IS” curve
that links the interest rate and aggregate demand
suggests that such an offset is appropriate. Reasoning
from a view that the real interest rate combines the
price of time and the price of risk suggests a more
cautious conclusion.
The decision to save or consume, to invest or wait for
improved conditions, depends on the intertemporal
price, which is the interest rate inclusive of the risk
associated with the decision. But today’s financial
markets have engineered instruments that enable the
price of risk and the pure intertemporal price to be
separated, so that decisions are made in the light of the
appropriate marginal price. The price of risk is
determined in global markets that signal the
opportunity cost of risk, and setting the policy interest
rate lower to offset a temporarily high price of risk
encourages inefficient, excessive risk taking. A safer
approach to monetary policy would be to continue to
focus on inflation and the output gap, set the interest
rate at the level that reflects the current and forecast
values of these variables, and create the most stable envi-
ronment possible in which financial markets can price
risk correctly.
Continuing to target inflation does not mean
ignoring the liquidity constraints that a credit crisis
inflicts on banks and other suppliers of credit.
Liquidity relief must be provided, but in providing it,
a central bank needs to be careful not to undermine
confidence in its own financial integrity. It achieves
this balance by willingly providing funds at a penalty
interest rate against high-quality collateral. How much
of its balance sheet the bank puts to this purpose
needs to be watched with care. The US Federal
Reserve might be getting close to the prudent limit. In
the year from August 2007 to August 2008, the Fed’s
monetary liabilities – the monetary base – increased
by only 2.3 percent. But during that same year, the
percentage of the Fed’s liabilities backed by US gov-
ernment securities decreased from 99 percent to 56
percent. In August 2008, the other 44 percent of the
Fed’s liabilities were backed by private securities of
varied quality under the Primary Dealer Credit
Facility, Term Securities Lending Facility, and Term
Auction Facility programs established in the wake of
the current credit crisis.32
Beyond providing liquidity, a central bank must
prevent bank failure from creating contagion and
financial collapse. As Bernanke and Gertler put it,
“[w]ell-designed and transparent legal and accounting
systems, a sound regulatory structure that helps to limit
the risk exposure of banks and corporations, and
prudent fiscal policies that help instil public confidence
in economic fundamentals, are all vital components of
an overall strategy to insulate the economy from
financial disturbances” (1999, pp 17-18).
Recommendations 
It bears repeating that much is right with Canada’s
monetary policy regime – the adjustments that the
Bank of Canada might make to improve it are slight:
￿ Target the path of the CPI rather than the inflation
rate and ensure that it rises by 2 percent a year on
the average, and commit to lowering this rate of
increase over the coming decade until true price-
level stability is achieved.
￿ Begin to experiment with interest-rate rules, and ask
the Bank’s research economists to examine the
robustness of alternative rules. Use the best rules as a
benchmark against which to check interest-rate
decisions.
￿ Provide an account of the interest-rate decision rules
that currently look good and that are used as a
benchmark.
￿ Report monetary policy performance in the form of
a Taylor curve graph, with the performance of
Canada and other targeters and nontargeters
compared against a best possible tradeoff. (Such a
graph would be very slow to change, but well worth
keeping in people’s minds as the appropriate way to
judge monetary policy performance.)
￿ Monitor financial stress indexes, asset prices, and the
price of risk, and when judgment suggests financial
instability is present or likely, consider modifying the
interest rate to avoid financial crisis, then explain in
detail both the concern and the reason for action.
￿ Continue to emphasize the limits of monetary
policy and the success its appropriate use can
achieve.
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